Leadership conflict and Chinese foreign policy: Deng's struggle for power and the Spratly's policy, 1977-88

Abstract: The thesis presents a cross-level analysis of China's policy-making process in the period leading up to the decision to establish a permanent presence on the Spratly Islands in January 1988. The emphasis is on the role of power relationships at the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy, that is, the 'core' leadership. It argues that this process fluctuated for ten years, chiefly as a result of Deng Xiapoing's opposition to any active pursuit of the Chinese claim. It also argues that the domestic political environment constituted the major influence upon the conduct of China's policy towards the dispute. Deng arrived at this position out of consideration for China's internal-external circumstances and needs, fearing that a forceful policy might trigger a regional conflict which in turn might damage China's more urgent domestic and international interests. Other 'core' leaders, however, read China's situation differently and favoured a pro-active policy. The theoretical foundation of this study is domestic and foreign policy analysis. It employs the concept of the 'paramount leader' in Chinese politics to explore who made decisions in China on the Spratlys issue, and how this influenced the country's handling of the dispute during the period 1977-88. Three contextual influences in the domestic-foreign policy nexus (economic, international and political) inform the empirical analysis. Four conclusions are drawn. First, the paramount leader approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-making in China, but not the processes and outcomes involved. Secondly, a correlation is established between changes in Deng's political status and changes in China's handling of the dispute. The leadership factor helps to explain the motivation of the paramount leader and the constraints bearing upon him, hence the 'cyclical' pattern of China's advance into the islands. Thirdly, it demonstrates that power struggles spill over into China's international behaviour. Finally, it shows that the 'paramount leader' concept does not translate into complete dominance of the policy-making process, as is clearly indicated by China's actual behaviour in the Spratlys dispute during the period 1977-88.

Submission note: A thesis submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the School of Politics and International Relations Program, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Bundoora.