Securing our data: subsea cables and maritime security in Southeast Asia

<p dir="ltr">Employing ‘weaponised interdependence’ as an analytical framework, this paper posits that the SCS constitutes a paradigmatic site for examining the strategic deployment of network centrality as a mechanism of geopolitical leverage. This framework elucidates how asymmetries in the global network topology enable great powers to consolidate power by instrumentalising infrastructural chokepoints to coerce, surveil, and dictate outcomes in transnational governance. Against this backdrop, the paper maps the unfolding dynamics of great power competition over submarine cable networks in the SCS, where material infrastructure intersects with the imperatives of sovereignty and national security. </p><p dir="ltr">The analysis foregrounds the politics of cable repair and maintenance regimes, particularly the regulation of licensing and permitting processes. These ostensibly technical practices, refracted through China’s expansive territorial claims, exemplify how regulatory mechanisms are deployed to reinforce asymmetrical authority and shape the region’s digital trajectory. The paper interrogates the cable protection regimes of all ASEAN SCS claimants and argues that ensuring subsea cable resiliency and unhampered digital connectivity requires the elimination of critical deficiencies in the existing cable protection frameworks of these actors. The study calls for stronger regional collaboration, public-private partnerships, and comprehensive policy frameworks to safeguard the region’s undersea cables.</p>