Social Epistemology and Knowing-How

This chapter reviews some key developments in discussions of the social dimensions of knowing-how. Drawing on ideas in Craig (1990) and Hawley (2011), it argues that we can better understand these issues by thinking of knowing-how as a kind of ‘downstream’ knowledge defined in terms of its role in guiding our actions and achievements. This is as opposed to knowing-that, which is normally analysed in terms of ‘upstream’ conditions concerned with the origins of a true belief state, conditions which are meant to reveal why knowledge itself is a kind of achievement. The chapter shows how this downstream-versus-upstream distinction can help to illuminate various putative differences between knowing-how and knowing-that with respect to testimony, demonstrating one’s knowledge to other people, and epistemic injustice. The chapter also suggests that these ideas might be applied further to issues concerning moral knowledge and wisdom.

https://philpapers.org/rec/CATSEA

https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/59903/chapter-abstract/512432431